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THE GOOD COP: KNOWING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
LAWFUL OR EFFECTIVE POLICING AND RIGHTFUL
POLICING—AND WHY IT MATTERS
TRACEY L. MEARES*
INTRODUCTION
There are two dominant ways to evaluate the police. The first is
whether their conduct comports with the law. The second approach
assesses whether they are effective crime fighters.1 The legal
domain is the province of lawyers and law professors. Their briefs
and scholarly writings depend usually on interpretations of con-
stitutional law and assessments of police conduct with reference to
that law. Sometimes other bodies of law, such as police agency
administrative regulations, civil lawsuits, or the very law that
authorizes police to act in the first place—substantive criminal
law—are the subject. But the assumption no matter the body of law
is that more lawfulness is the ideal goal. Effectiveness at crime
fighting has become the other police evaluation metric. This
yardstick is of newer vintage than lawfulness, and those who wield
it are primarily social scientists—criminologists and economists
—who attempt to find causal connections between various police
practices and crime statistics. The theoretical model these social
* Walton Hale Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale University. Thanks go to Ben
Grunwald for helpful research assistance and to Ben Justice and Tom Tyler for comments
on an earlier draft of the lecture that became this Essay. I am also appreciative of comments
and questions from students and audience members at the George Wythe Lecture at
William & Mary Law School, who help me sharpen and deepen the discussion here.
1. See, e.g., Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-Oriented Policing, 39 CRIME &
JUST. 1, 1-4, 23-40 (2010); Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for
Police Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
479, 483 (2009); Heather Mac Donald, Op-Ed., Fighting Crime Where the Criminals Are,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at A19 (describing the New York City Police Department’s use
of the CompStat System as a strategy to achieve effective policing).
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scientists employ typically assumes that offenders are rational
actors who are persuaded to desist from criminal behavior when the
prospect of formal punishment outweighs the benefits of criminal
behavior.
This Essay will present a third view called “rightful policing.”
Rightful policing attempts to account for what people say that they
care about when assessing police agent behavior specifically and
police agencies in general. It is different from lawful policing and
efficient policing in at least two ways. First, rightful policing does
not depend on the actual lawfulness of police conduct. Instead,
rightful policing depends primarily on the procedural justice or
fairness of police conduct. Second, rightful policing does not depend
on an assessment of police as ever more effective crime fighters,
although it turns out that rightful policing often leads to more com-
pliance with the law and therefore lower crime rates. Additionally,
and critically, it is likely this third way helps us move toward police
governance that is substantially, as opposed to rhetorically, demo-
cratic.
My Essay will proceed in four parts. First, I will lay out the two
often-used metrics of police evaluation, lawfulness and crime-
fighting effectiveness. Next, I will explain the theoretical foundation
underlying the third way, which is what I am calling rightful
policing. In the third Section, I will present an overview of empirical
work that I have done in collaboration with my colleague, Tom
Tyler, and others. This work demonstrates that ordinary people
care a great deal about the theoretical precepts underlying rightful
policing. In the Essay’s last Section, I will conclude with some im-
plications of both the theory and the empirical results for governing
police in a way that is meaningfully democratic. In short, I will
sketch out what it could mean to produce the Good Cop.
I. TWO VIEWS: MORE LAW OR LESS CRIME? NEVER THE TWAIN
SHALL MEET
I begin with Weber, who famously said the state is the entity that
“upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
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force in the enforcement of its order.”2 Law, then, is what legiti-
mizes Weberian policing. That law authorizes, circumscribes, and
shapes police activity is what distinguishes police from vigilantes.
According to this view, evaluating policing with reference to its
lawfulness is one of the most important aspects of democratic
society.3
Law suffuses policing. As Rachel Harmon of the University of
Virginia has pointed out recently, the laws that regulate police
conduct vary from international treaties to federal statutory and
constitutional law to state constitutions, statutes, and regulations.4
There are local ordinances and internal department administrative
regulations, too. And these bodies of law do not even encompass
those rules providing for police qualification and training, those per-
taining to police management and organization, and laws regarding
access to information about the police. There has been very little
scholarship about the vast majority of these laws. The reason is
that when many people think about lawful police behavior, they are
referring primarily to contemporary criminal procedure, a muscular
body of interconnected doctrines that tell police when they can
interact with suspects on the street, what procedures they must
follow before searching or seizing someone, how interrogations must
be conducted, and what kind of authority they have to maintain
public order.5 Much of this law specifies remedies for rule trans-
gression. It is, in other words, primarily about redressing the ille-
gitimate exercise of power.
2. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 154 (Talcott
Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1964) (emphasis omitted). I refer to
Weber’s notion that police serve to effect the state’s legitimate monopoly on physical force.
For an engaging explication of this idea and how it relates to the development of the modern
police officer, see Rubén G. Rumbaut & Egon Bittner, Changing Conceptions of the Police
Role: A Sociological Review, 1 CRIME & JUST. 239, 269-70 (1979).
3. For this reason, legality is such a central concept in criminal law. For one of the best
discussions of the role of legality, see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 205-19 (1985) (discussing the justifications
for the legality principle including separation of powers concerns, notice arguments, and
discretion control).
4. See generally Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 785,
795-808 (2012) (discussing the often-ignored bodies of law beyond constitutional amendments
that regulate police activity).
5. See id. at 765-68 (explaining what Harmon calls the “conventional paradigm” of police
regulation).
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This last point is crucial. The dominant approach to thinking
about police lawfulness is to assess it in terms of a trade-off be-
tween the risk of arbitrary or oppressive enforcement and individ-
ual rights.6 The dominant approach does not usually focus on police
effectiveness at reducing crime—a point to which I will return in a
moment. Rather, the assessment of police in lawfulness terms
almost always casts police as a necessary evil as opposed to a wel-
come utility or potentially critical mechanism for empowering com-
munities in democratic terms.7 In this world the ideal is always less
policing.
What are the implications of lawfulness as a yardstick? When
lawyers, legal scholars, and criminal justice practitioners observe
what they consider to be the overexercise of state power in the form
of stops and arrests, they move quickly to describe the problem as
a legal one. New York City8 and Philadelphia9 provide ready
examples. Members of the lawfulness tribe typically frame their
observations with respect to constitutional law to describe police
transgressions.10 Arrests and stops become problematic because
6. For one example criticizing the police lawfulness trade-off, consider the discussion
by Meares and Kahan of the legal struggle regarding searches for guns in Chicago public
housing. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of
Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 3,
3-5, 20-21, 28-29 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999).
7. Compare Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against
Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 300 (2010) (discussing the decision in Terry v. Ohio,
which characterized police as necessary despite their possible intrusion on individuals’
rights), with Meares & Kahan, supra note 6, at 18-20 (describing a regime in which
communities could democratically choose to allow what otherwise might be a limitation of
individuals’ constitutional rights in order to achieve safety in that particular community).
8. New York City cops performed well over 500,000 street stops in 2009, up from
313,000 in 2004. See DELORES JONES-BROWN ET AL., CTR. ON RACE, CRIME & JUSTICE OF JOHN
JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STOP, QUESTION & FRISK POLICING PRACTICES IN NEW YORK
CITY 4, 19 (2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/33806018/ Stop-Question-and-Frisk-
Policing-Practices-in-NYC-a-Primer.
9. In Philadelphia, data for 2009 indicate that the Philadelphia Police Department made
253,000 pedestrian stops and 250,000 car stops. Given Philadelphia’s population, these
numbers yield an even higher per capita encounter rate than New York City’s. See E-mail
from Professor David Rudovsky, Senior Fellow, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., to author (July 25,
2011) (on file with author).
10. Legal scholars and lawyers commonly reference the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution when looking to legal provisions to explain the wrongfulness of racial
profiling. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1278-87 (1998) (arguing that more stringent
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they do not conform to the Fourth or sometimes Fifth Amendment
principles that restrict and circumscribe these actions. If the
constitutional violation is the problem, then the remedy, seemingly,
is apparent. The architecture of law and rights both describes and
solves problematic urban street policing.
The realities of street policing, however, tend to defy description
in legal terms—especially when the relevant legal rubric is heavily
dependent on constitutional law. Although it is true that various
bodies of law, constitutional law among them, shape policing
authority, it is also true that the exercise of police power takes
place largely at the discretion of individual police officers. This is a
point Kenneth Culp Davis made famous decades ago, but scholars
still are much too quick to ignore it.11 Consider that most police
officers work alone and not under the direct gaze of a supervisor.12
Supervisors rarely have the opportunity to learn about an individ-
ual officer’s eight-hour shift (during which the officer is heavily
armed) except through the formal reports an officer fills out if he or
she happens to make an arrest. And arrests themselves are
relatively rare events.13 Police deal more with criminal suspects,
homeless individuals, drunks, and prostitutes in potentially
troublesome situations than they do with “ordinary citizens,” so
neither the police nor those they encounter have particularly strong
incentives to reveal very much about their encounters. This means
opportunities for corruption are higher than they might otherwise
Fourth Amendment standards would address problems related to racial profiling of African
American men on the street).
11. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4-5
(1969). The gist of Davis’s argument was that statutory and judge-made law is overdeveloped
in comparison to regulatory law with respect to policing and similar agencies. See id. at 18.
Davis also argued, controversially, that the most serious police problem was getting police
to do anything, as opposed to keeping them from doing bad things. See id. at 88-89.
12. See, e.g., PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN
DISTRICT 111-20 (2008) (discussing the realities of police discretion in an urban environ-
ment). See generally JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS,
AND HATE CRIME 14-15, 21-22 (2002) (discussing everyday police tasks in the context of the
policing of hate crime).
13. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 821-29 (2011) (reviewing studies of urban police
workload and showing that patrol-and-stop activities are much more common than the
execution of search and arrest warrants).
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be.14 On top of all of this, it is difficult to punish police officers who
violate because agencies in many municipalities are subject to
strong union rules that tie the hands of those who manage street
cops.15 Broad discretion allows police to shape, redescribe, and
recategorize situations and contexts in ways that defy strictly
defined codes, so that attempts to specify strict rule compliance
seem somewhat misfitting.
Recently, the manner in which police manage their discretion has
become a flashpoint in policing as departments have developed
strategies based on the widespread use of stop-and-frisk approaches
that bring officers into frequent contact with people on the street.16
Increased police discretion has led to a series of public controversies
over racial profiling,17 zero-tolerance policing,18 aggressive police
14. See, e.g., Darius Charney et al., Panel Discussion, Suspect Fits Description: Responses
to Racial Profiling in New York City, 14 CUNY L. REV. 57, 66-67 (2010).
15. See DARREL W. STEPHENS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. & NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE OF THE
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE DISCIPLINE: A CASE FOR CHANGE (2011) (exploring the
implications of union power in police management); see also Alan Suderman, Montgomery
Attorney: Police Officers Get Light Punishments Thanks to Union, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar.
19, 2012, 11:25 AM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/montgomery-attorney-police-officers-
get-light-punishments-thanks-to-union/article/106625.
16. Many municipalities argue that stop-and-frisk policies reduce crime. See John Coté
& Heather Knight, Stop-and-Frisk Policy Might Cut Violence, Ed Lee Says, S.F. CHRON.
(June 27, 2012, 11:27 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Stop-and-frisk-policy-might-
cut-violence-Ed-Lee-3668653.php; Raymond W. Kelly, Stop-and-Frisk Bill Imperils N.Y.: Ray
Kelly Says Database Helps NYPD Protect Young Black Men, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 13, 2010,
4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/stop-and-frisk-bill-imperils-n.y.-Ray-Kelly-
database-helps-nypd-protect-young-black-men-article-1.468308; Mac Donald, supra note 1,
at A19; Heather Mac Donald, Stop & Frisk Facts, N.Y. POST (May 21, 2012, 10:15 PM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/stop_frisk_facts_rVuSm8oy
OMhFdNe0PzGKsO; Ray Rivera & Al Baker, Police Cite Help From Stop-and-Frisk Data in
170 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2010, at A15; Michael Howard Saul & Sean Gardiner, Kelly
Shifts Policy on Stop and Frisk, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2012, at A15; Kate Taylor, Police Street
Stops Hit a Record, Rising 14%, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, at A21.
17. See, e.g., Al Baker, City Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2010, at A1, A27; Al Baker & Ray Rivera, Thousands of Street Stops by New York Police Were
Legally Unjustified, a Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010, at A22; Chris Dolmetsch, New
York Police Lose Second Stop-and-Frisk Case on Appeal, BLOOMBERG (July 4, 2012, 12:10
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/n-y-court-tosses-second-stop-and-frisk-
arrest.html; Tamer El-Ghobashy et al., Judge Clears Stop-Frisk Class Action, WALL ST. J.,
May 17, 2012, at A19; Editorial, Stop-and-Frisk Needs Reform, PHILA. TRIB., June 24, 2011,
at 10A; Kate Taylor, Gay Rights Groups Are Joining Oppostion to Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2012, at A17. Critics have been trenchant, and some victims have filed suit alleging
civil rights violations. See, e.g, Dolmetsch, supra; El-Ghobashy et al., supra; Editorial, supra.
18. See John Eterno, Policing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2012, at A23; Sean
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stops,19 and covert surveillance.20 Police and political leaders have
defended their actions as necessary to reduce violent crime in
cities,21 and their arguments bring me to the second oft-used ap-
proach to evaluating police: whether or not they are effective at
reducing crime.
Many readers might today take for granted the idea that police
make a difference in crime rates, but this was not always so. The
conventional wisdom, at least from the 1960s until the mid-1990s,
was that police had very little impact on crime rates. David Bayley,
in his 1994 book, Police for the Future, sums up this view nicely:
The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept
secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, but
the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that they are
society’s best defense against crime and continually argue that
if they are given more resources, especially personnel, they will
be able to protect communities against crime. This is a myth.22
The idea that police can do little to impact crime became en-
trenched among scholars following the 1967 groundbreaking
report of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.
That report detailed the relationship between so-called root causes
and crime.23 If crime was rooted in poverty and deprivation, then
Gardiner, Police Officer Sues, Alleging Quota System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2012, at A17
(discussing how quotas may lead police officers to stop and frisk individuals when they
otherwise might not); Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Seeks Cut in Frisk Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 2012, at A1.
19. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 17; Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police
Stops, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2010, at A1, A17.
20. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Philadelphia Defends Policy on Frisking, with Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2012, at A11, A14; Rivera et al., supra note 19.
21. See, e.g., Chris Francescani et al., NYC Mayor Defends “Stop and Frisk” at Black
Church, REUTERS (June 10, 2012, 2:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/10/us-
usa-newyork-stopandfrisk-idUSBRE8590CE20120610; Goode, supra note 20 (describing
Philadelphia Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey’s defense of the stop-and-frisk policy due
to decreased gun violence). But see Joseph Goldstein, Resistance to Prosecuting Stop-and-
Frisk Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012, at A21.
22. DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 3 (1994).
23. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 17-18 (1967), available at http://ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf.
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what could police do to stop it? Of course, police could and should
be responders for justice reasons. Offenders should be called to
account for their behavior. But police fulfillment of that role did not
necessarily lead to lower crime rates.24 The view espoused in the
Commission’s report percolated for decades.25 Scholars pursuing
research into “police science,”26 then nascent, often wrote of the
police role in preventing crime; however, much of this research
emphasized identifying and addressing the needs of troubled youth
more than it promoted the notion that the patrolman on the street
could make a substantial difference in the crime rate.27
The political economy of criminal justice likely also fueled
Bayley’s pessimism. The governmental units with resources, both
political and financial, to address crime are state and federal rather
than municipal. Governance and funding of policing are, of course,
located at the local level.28 Thus, until President Clinton put
24. See id. at 25 (presenting the ironic paradigm that more formal police methods may
actually lead to an apparent rise in crime rates).
25. The following quote is indicative: 
[T]he fact that the police deal daily with crime does not mean that they have
unlimited power to prevent it, or reduce it, or deter it. The police did not create
and cannot resolve the social conditions that stimulate crime. They did not start
and cannot stop the convulsive social changes that are taking place in America.
They do not enact the laws that they are required to enforce, nor do they
dispose of the criminals they arrest. The police are only one part of the criminal
justice system ... and the government is only one part of society. Insofar as
crime is a social phenomenon, crime prevention is the responsibility of every
part of society. The criminal process is limited to case by case operations, one
criminal or one crime at a time.
Id. at 92.
26.  Id. at 116.
27. See Walter A. Lunden, The Theory of Crime Prevention, 2 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 213,
226-27 (1961) (discussing a strategy relying again upon identifying troubled youth and
“drafting” them into correctional corps—an approach in which potentially relevant police
activities are notable due to their absence); August Vollmer, The Prevention and Detection
of Crime as Viewed by a Police Officer, 125 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 148, 152-53
(1926) (suggesting that crime reduction for police was a relatively new and emerging idea
practiced by a small number of departments); John E. Winters, The Role of the Police in the
Prevention and Control of Delinquency, 21 FED. PROBATION 3, 3-4 (1957) (suggesting that
police would more effectively prevent crime by getting involved in the identification and
service of kids who showed signs of delinquency).
28. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 64-66 (2011)
(pointing to the bifurcation between state and federal governments on the one hand and
municipal ones on the other and explaining how this dynamic leads to poor funding and
support of necessary police forces).
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policing on the map in 1994 with his crime bill, there had been no
natural opportunity to interrupt a crime control agenda dominated
by criminal legislation and imprisonment.29 The establishment
during the Clinton administration of the Community Oriented
Policing, or COPS, Office, with its mandate to distribute 100,000
police officers among local jurisdictions, as well as innovations in
econometrics and in evaluating policing strategies, have upended
David Bayley’s conventional wisdom.30 The question is no longer
whether police can make a difference. We ask instead, “How much
of a difference in crime rates can police make?”
The relationship between New York City’s recent and dramatic
reduction in the crime rate and the city’s policing methods is today
a very hot topic among scholars and others.31 Crime in New York
City has dropped as much as 90 percent over the last twenty years.
Is the drop a function of innovative policing in the form of CompStat
and aggressive stop and frisk, as some claim, or does it have more
to do with changes in drug markets, economic changes, or changes
in demography and the like? The new literature is voluminous, but
it is worth reviewing a few highlights. One problem that historically
plagued social scientists attempting to show that the increases in
the number of police on the street could actually impact crime is the
fact that governments usually deploy more police to areas with
high crime rates. My former colleague, economist Steven Levitt of
Freakonomics fame, seemingly broke this endogeneity problem in
a well-known 1997 paper by using mayoral and gubernatorial elec-
tions as instruments, and he showed that increases in the size of
police forces actually do result in lower crime rates.32 Other crim
29. See Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 578
(1996).
30. See JEFFREY A. ROTH & JOSEPH F. RYAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF:
THE COPS PROGRAM AFTER 4 YEARS—NATIONAL EVALUATION 4 (Aug. 2000).
31. For a notable recent example, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME
SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 3-5, 100 (2012).
32. Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of
Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 286 (1997). I say seemingly because another
economist, Justin McCrary, found that Levitt’s results were caused by a programming error.
See Justin McCrary, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police
on Crime: Comment, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1236, 1236-37 (2002). However, later studies seem
to confirm the causal effect Levitt originally attempted to establish. See Rafael Di Tella &
Ernesto Schargrodsky, Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of Police
Forces After a Terrorist Attack, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 115, 130-31 (2004); Jonathan Klick &
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inological research over the last couple of decades has shown that
deploying police forces in geographically focused ways, such as hot
spot policing, can have a significant impact on crime without
resulting in displacement to other areas.33 Indeed, sociologist David
Weisburd has shown that this kind of policing can result in dif-
fusion of benefits of crime reduction beyond the area of focused
policing as opposed to displacement of crime.34 Other scholars have
demonstrated that strategies such as problem-oriented policing and
community policing can be useful to address crime and the fear of
crime.35 
But there is one notable gap in the police effectiveness discussion:
lawfulness is largely irrelevant to it. On occasion the rare social
scientist might point to police law breaking as a potential “cost” to
balance against the benefit of policing that effectively reduces
crime.36 But this happens only rarely. It is almost as if social
scientists presume that policing takes place lawfully.
Correlatively, the lawfulness discussion proceeds as if police
effectiveness is not only irrelevant but almost an anathema when
it comes time to evaluate police. The party line here is that police
adherence to strict dictates that constrain their discretion always
results in more liberty for individuals, and the higher levels of
crime that we might experience as a result of less policing is simply
a price we pay for more freedom in society.37 What this view ignores
is that crime and predation among individuals can and does result
in significantly less freedom for residents of high crime communi-
ties. Residents of high crime communities, for example, could and
Alexander Tabarrock, Using Terror Alert Levels to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 48
J.L. & ECON. 267, 277 (2005).
33. See ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L. WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLACES: CRIME
HOT SPOTS AND EFFECTIVE PREVENTION 15-17 (2010).
34. See David Weisburd et al., Does Crime Just Move Around the Corner? A Controlled
Study of Spatial Displacement and Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 549,
584 (2006).
35. See COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND
EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 84-85 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds.,
2004).
36. See David H. Bayley, Commentary, Law Enforcement and the Rule of Law: Is There
a Tradeoff?, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 133, 133-35, 145 (2002) (exploring this problem).
37. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 6, at 18-22.
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often do see higher levels of policing as a way to achieve freedom as
opposed to a way to limit it.38
II. THE THIRD WAY: RIGHTFUL POLICING
A third way to evaluate police is attentive to both lawfulness and
effectiveness and captures important dimensions that neither of the
prevailing modes of evaluation do. I call this approach “rightful
policing.” Rightful policing is grounded in the social psychological
concept of legitimacy. Legitimacy in this context is positive rather
than normative. My colleague and coauthor Tom Tyler has defined
legitimacy in this way: a “property that a rule or an authority has
when others feel obligated to voluntarily defer to that rule or au-
thority.... [A] legitimate authority is one that is regarded by people
as entitled to have its decisions and rules accepted and followed by
others.”39 Note that in defining legitimacy in this way I am not
offering a philosophical justification of why people ought to defer to
authorities. My claim is descriptive in that I will explore the extent
to which people do defer—or, at least say that they do.40
People systematically focus on a few dimensions when evaluating
police (and judges and teachers, and so on). First, participation is
an important element. People report higher levels of satisfaction in
encounters with authorities when they have an opportunity to
explain their situation and perspective on that situation.41 Second,
people care a great deal about the fairness of decision making by
authorities.42 That is, they look to indicia of decision-maker neu-
trality, objectivity and factuality of decision making, consistency in
38. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City,
32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 830-32 (1998) (discussing community empowerment through law
enforcement).
39. Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 313 (2009).
40. Additionally, we mean to emphasize the public feeling of obligation as opposed to
personal morality. Personal morality has been shown to be an important motivator of
compliance. However, voluntary deference resulting from public legitimacy is also
powerful—especially as compared to deference resulting from fear of the potential imposition
of formal punishment. For the seminal work on this point, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW 3-5 (1990).
41. See Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 84, 94 (2004).
42. Id.
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decision making, and transparency.43 Third, people care a great deal
about how organization leaders treat them. Specifically, people
desire to be treated with dignity, with respect for their rights, and
with politeness.44 Fourth, in their interactions with authorities,
people want to believe that authorities are acting out of a sense of
benevolence toward them. That is, people attempt to discern why
authorities are acting the way they do by assessing how they are
acting. They want to trust that the motivations of the authorities
are sincere, benevolent, and well intentioned.45 Together these indi-
cia comprise a model of procedural justice,46 which is the basis of
legitimacy. A robust body of social science evidence from around the
world shows that people are more likely to voluntarily obey the law
when they believe that authorities have the right to tell them what
to do.47 
The legitimacy account’s dynamic is inherently social. Rather
than being primarily concerned with outcomes and individual
maximization of utility, legitimacy-based compliance is centered on
individual identity and is relational.48 People tend to seek a favor-
able social identity within the groups to which they belong. People
also seek a favorable social status for their group vis-à-vis other
groups. Psychologists Allan Lind and Tom Tyler explain that people
43. Id.; see Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy:
Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 253, 255 (2004).
44. Tyler, supra note 41, at 94-95.
45. See id. at 95.
46. See Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural
Justice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
747, 755-56 (2003) (finding support for a hypothesized four-component model of procedural
justice wherein people are influenced by two aspects of formal procedures of the group—those
that indicate quality of decision making and those that relate to quality of treatment—and
additionally people are separately influenced by two aspects of authorities with whom they
deal—the quality of the decisions authorities make and the quality of treatment they receive
from authorities); see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 131-32 (1988) (exploring Gerald Leventhal’s six procedural justice
rules, which are similar to those mentioned above); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A
Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115,
122 (1992).
47. See generally Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International
Perspectives, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 9 (Tom
R. Tyler ed., 2007) (exploring the impact of perceptions of legitimacy in criminal justice
systems across the globe).
48. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 46, at 140-43.
2013] THE GOOD COP 1877
care about procedural justice because it provides them with im-
portant informational signals that they view as relevant to their
identities.49 For example, if a police officer treats a person rudely
during an encounter, that person will process that treatment as
information relevant to how legal authorities tend to view her, as
well as the group to which she belongs. The conclusion undoubtedly
will be a negative one. Pride and respect, then, are much more
important motivators of behavior than is formal punishment, for
loss of status can occur without punishment.50 Indeed, punishment
can operate to enhance status.51 Tyler and Fagan demonstrate that
the police can give a person a ticket or even arrest her while simul-
taneously enhancing police legitimacy if they are respectful and fair
to the person they are dealing with.52 By affirming and enhancing
a person’s status within society, the police are giving that person
something valuable—a positive sense of self and identity—that is
more important to them than the valence of their outcome.
One implication of this is that when police generate good feelings
in their everyday contacts, it turns out people are also motivated to
help them fight crime.53 We can expect all of this to lead to lower
crime rates in communities. Importantly, safer communities are not
the only important result of law enforcement authorities and other
government representatives treating people with dignity and fair-
ness. Another result is healthy and democratic communities. Amy
Gutmann trenchantly observes, “We earn each other’s respect as
equal citizens in some very basic ways. We show ourselves capable
of abiding by the results of fair procedures, honoring the rights of
others, and supporting the passage of laws and public policies that
we can justify to one another.”54 Policing in ways that the public
49. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 46, at 230-37.
50. See id. at 158-59.
51. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the
Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 448 (1993).
52. See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help
the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 262 (2008).
53. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE 66-67, 73, 76-80 (2011) (explaining that
procedural justice is the basis of cooperation that leads to more compliance); Tyler & Fagan,
supra note 52, at 262-65 (same).
54. See Amy Gutmann, Why Should Schools Care About Civic Education?, in
REDISCOVERING THE DEMOCRATIC PURPOSES OF EDUCATION 73, 74 (Lorraine M. McDonnell
et al. eds., 2000) (“Fair procedures are essential to a healthy democracy.”).
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recognizes as legitimate is one of the many ways that legal authori-
ties build and replicate strong government.
Rightful policing is also relevant to lawfulness as an evaluation
mechanism, although the two dimensions are importantly not
coincident. One way to see the connection is to imagine four points
on a compass, as in Figure 1. If we array lawfulness from east to
west, with lawfulness to the east and unlawfulness to the west,
naturally we want and expect police to be as far east as they could
possibly be. In the east, police should not undertake to arrest some-
one, or even stop that person, unless there is a statute or ordinance
indicating that the conduct in question is unlawful. They should not
move to arrest or engage a person unless they have gathered
enough facts to meet the constitutionally required level of suspicion
that the Fourth Amendment specifies. Once an encounter has
begun, the officer should endeavor to follow every general order or
administrative rule relevant to the specific context, and so on.
Now imagine procedural justice or legitimacy as running north
and south on our compass. When police comport themselves in ways
that confer dignity on those with whom they interact and otherwise
treat people with respect, we will say they are “headed north.”
Examples here include providing high-quality interpersonal treat-
ment;55 offering citizens an opportunity to tell their side of the story
during an encounter;56 and being transparent about the reasons for
the encounter and explaining in advance what will happen during
the encounter. The last of these examples, moreover, raises the
probability that a citizen will conclude that the officer’s decisions
are fact based and neutral rather than arbitrary.57 When an officer’s
conduct is inconsistent with these yardsticks, we will categorize
that behavior as “running south.” Putting the two parts together,
we see that the best place for cops to be is the northeast.58 That is
55. See Tyler, supra note 41, at 91-93 (synthesizing and summarizing a wide range of
research in this area).
56. Id. at 94.
57. See id.
58. It should be obvious that these two dimensions are not completely orthogonal to one
another. Consider that one of the procedural justice dimensions, concern for dignity and
rights, clearly implicates notions of lawfulness. Thus, there is likely some interaction among
characteristics. The important point is to see that law, as it stands today and possibly into
the future, cannot capture all aspects of procedural justice. One suspects that legislated
politeness, for example, ceases to be such. And, to the extent that the dimensions capture
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where one will find rightful policing, which is policing that is both
lawful and procedurally just. 
Figure 1
The fundamental problem with evaluating police conduct solely
with respect to lawfulness is that the law has no capacity, or very
little capacity, as it is written today to tell police how to arrest or
stop someone in a way that will tend to support police legitimacy.59
More than this, police rarely are trained in norms that would sup-
port this disposition. Instead, rookie police officers spend literally
hours and hours reading law to learn when they are legally allowed
to stop, arrest, and search.60 They are not correspondingly trained
about how to conduct themselves so as to create and maintain
their legitimacy in the community. The consequence is plain: any
attempted strategy to both describe and remedy a problem that
exists in multiple dimensions will fail if the proposed strategy is
unidimensional. 
different aspects of what people care about, the disjuncture that we describe here will
continue to exist.
59. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2141
(2002).
60. We canvassed several policing agencies across the country including the departments
in Boston, Chicago, New Haven, and San Francisco. The number of hours rookies spend
learning the law ranges from a high of 258 hours out of 1040 hours of total training in
Boston, representing approximately 25 percent of the total training hours, to 98 hours out
of a total 1184 hours of total training in San Francisco, representing just over 8 percent of
the total training hours.
1880 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1865
Along with Tom Tyler,61 I have conducted an experimental survey
designed to explore citizen assessment of police conduct and
engagement with other citizens with reference to the dimensions
captured in the figure above.
III. A LITTLE DATA62
In March 2008, we conducted a nationwide study of the influence
of lawfulness and procedural justice in policing on public judgments
about the appropriateness of police conduct and the need to
discipline police officers, with the goal of improving our ability to
identify key factors influencing public views about when police
conduct is appropriate or inappropriate. Through the unraveling of
interconnected individual, contextual, and situational factors, we
sought to enhance our understanding of the salient pathways
through which citizens make judgments about the appropriateness
of police actions. 
This study included two connected components to assess the in-
fluence of demographic, experiential, situational, and contextual
factors on citizens’ perceptions and evaluations of police actions.
One component was a questionnaire that measured factors we
hypothesized to influence how citizens perceive and evaluate
police-citizen encounters. The second component was a factorial
experiment that tested how citizens perceived and evaluated these
types of encounters in manipulated vignettes that incorporated
actual police video. 
The study’s two-part design allowed us to analyze people’s per-
ceptions of police authority on several levels. First, we were able to
compare the effects of the past experiences of individuals, their
social contexts, and personal histories with the influence of the
specific context of an event and a description of its participants on
how people understand and evaluate police-citizen interactions.
61. Tyler and I worked on a subpart of the project. The coprincipal investigators on the
entire project, Legitimacy and Policing, funded by the American Bar Foundation and Yale
Law School’s Ruebhausen Fund, are Anthony Braga, Jeffrey Fagan, Christopher Winship,
Tom Tyler, and myself.
62. The following Section is a summary of research presented in Tracey L. Meares, Tom
R. Tyler & Jacob Gardener, The Two Different Worlds We Live In: Lawfulness and Perceived
Police Misconduct (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 255, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116645.
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Second, we were able to compare how people in varying social
positions—defined by characteristics such as age, race, gender,
income, and occupation—evaluate the same incident when it is
framed identically, and then whether their evaluations change
when we provide alternate framing information in terms of past
police-community relations, legality of the stop, and individuals
involved. And third, we could ascertain whether the effects of group
membership, past experience with the police and crime, and general
perceptions of the police remain constant under all experimental
conditions.63 
In a subpart of the larger study, Tyler and I sought to determine
how actual lawfulness of police behavior and perceptions of
procedural justice influenced people’s desire to punish the police
officers for the conduct observed in the videos. We asked respon-
dents to view three videos in random order. In each video the police
exercised some level of authority over the person stopped, ranging
from verbal commands to the use of physical force. Before viewing
the clips, respondents read factual scenarios regarding the lawful-
ness of police actions in the video. For example, respondents were
told prior to viewing a video that the officers stopped someone
because they were driving “erratically” as opposed to “while they
were driving appropriately and within the speed limit.” Finally,
after viewing the videotape respondents evaluated the procedural
justice of the actions of the police, assessing, for example, whether
the police listened to the person stopped; whether they acted
neutrally; whether they were respectful; and so forth. Respondents
also evaluated whether the police had engaged in wrongdoing and
whether they should be punished.
63. A critical feature of the study was to vary the order in which respondents completed
these components. That is, one half of the respondents completed the questionnaire first, and
the other half completed the experimental component first. Given the large sample (1361
participants), this allowed us to assess whether respondents who completed the
questionnaire first were primed by exposure to questions that might have influenced their
evaluations of the vignettes in the experimental component.
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To analyze the responses, we divided the subjects into two groups
—one high procedural justice and the other low. Given that we pro-
vided to our respondents scenarios that were either lawful or not,
we could assess the relative extent to which fairness, or lack of it,
and lawfulness, or lack of it, affected the extent to which respon-
dents believed police deserved to be punished. The average level of
punishment suggested for the police could then be assessed within
each group. Figure 2 shows such an analysis that combines results
across the three videos.64
In this graph, the rating moves closer to 3 as the respondent’s
preference for punishment increases. The graph demonstrates
clearly that procedural justice is a major factor in that determina-
tion. When procedural justice is high, punishment preferences are
almost one full point lower than they are when procedural justice
is low. In contrast, the distinction between the lawfulness condi-
tions barely registers. Note that in both the low and high proce-
dural justice conditions, moving from lawful to unlawful has almost

64. The numbers shown combine all three videos. The videos contained three lawful
conditions (lawful, unlawful, and no information), but only the lawful and unlawful means
are shown. The perceived procedural justice scale was divided at the mean to form two
categories. The scale runs from 1 to 5. High scores indicate a strong desire to punish the
officers involved. The entries are the mean for each group.
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no impact on punishment preferences. The lines basically are flat.
These basic findings confirm the intuitions presented in the rightful
policing compass laid out above in Figure 1:
1. People’s ordinary intuitions about rightful police behavior do
not comport with lawfulness, at least as captured by constitu-
tional law.
2. A two-dimensional view that accounts for lawfulness and
fairness is necessary to bridge long-standing gaps between
policing agencies and communities.
The second point in particular has implications for police gover-
nance—especially governance through law.
IV. LOOKING FOR THE GOOD COP
Police are creatures of law and are trained in it. Police are not
everyday lawyers.65 They strive to conform their behavior to a set
of norms and scripts heavily influenced by formal law. The bifurca-
tion we see on the spectrum of evaluations that ordinary people
make regarding police behavior represents a social psychological
disjuncture in police-citizen engagement that is damaging to citi-
zens, counterproductive for policing agencies, and ultimately incon-
sistent with the crime reduction project that is critical to so many
cities today. As the research on procedural justice I outlined above
suggests, police and ordinary citizens live in two different worlds
with respect to the law that governs the former, and this is a
situation that is likely to result in ordinary citizens being alienated
from the very agents of the state that the same citizens expect to be
available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 365 days per year. The
state of affairs is not tolerable because democratic legitimacy
requires police and citizens to come together.
It is true that police and ordinary citizens could come together
through formal law. We could imagine educating the public so that
65. See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (offering an analysis of the ways ordinary Americans deploy law every
day); LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE PUBLIC
SPEECH (2004) (exploring the legal consciousness of ordinary citizens in the context of free
speech).
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their everyday lawyering better comports with articulated constitu-
tional law. Going back to my schematic in Figure 1, we could
imagine rotating the north-south axis toward the horizontal. I
believe such a task is likely a fool’s errand, however. The resources
involved would be enormous, and the project also seems to bump up
against the natural inclination that people have to choose eval-
uative methods that are consistent with and affirm their social
identity. Constitutional law, as it is currently composed, does not
emphasize the importance of quality of police treatment but rather
places a premium on the police officer’s intention when she decides
to exercise her discretion to engage someone.66 Nothing about
constitutional law prohibits a cop from being rude, and very little
of constitutional criminal procedure promotes the kinds of dignity
concerns that people tend to care about. Indeed, much of the law is
even at odds with these concerns.67
A different reform strategy, then, is to advocate change in the
legal rules that shape police conduct. Presumably we ought to think
about rotating the east-west axis up. The late William Stuntz of-
fered a characteristically crystalline assessment pertinent to this
idea:
Fourth Amendment law devotes an enormous amount of atten-
tion to the fact of searches and seizures, but almost none to how
those searches and seizures are carried out. That ought to be
reversed; sharp legal lines between “searches” and “seizures”
and everything else ought to be replaced with hazier boundaries
between decent police behavior and the indecent kind.68
Stuntz may be right. Perhaps we could imagine constitutional law
operating in the way that he suggests. Indeed, I have argued that
something along these lines existed in the early days of criminal
procedure before the Warren Court revolution, when the Court was
committed to pursuing fundamental fairness through due process
66. See Tracey L. Meares, The Distribution of Dignity and the Fourth Amendment, in THE
POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 123,
127 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012); Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2141.
67. See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 13, at 811-14 (discussing the problems with using
suspicion as a method to control police discretion); Meares, supra note 66, at 130.
68. Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2141.
2013] THE GOOD COP 1885
as opposed to attempting to work out a code of criminal procedure
through incorporation of the Bill of Rights.69 
Although I have not yet completely worked out the following idea,
I think we may be better served by keeping the rightful policing
axes separate and tending toward orthogonal to one another. If this
is right, then the legitimacy axis is pursued through norms and
training as opposed to legislation and codification. We should edu-
cate police officers about procedural justice. We need to emphasize
that police should comport their behavior with constitutional rules.
And we ought to encourage them to treat people with dignity and
respect regardless of whether the rules require it. One way to em-
phasize the importance of this last requirement is to truly under-
stand that, paraphrasing British legal scholar Neil Walker, “[t]he
police ... are both minders and reminders of community ... —a
producer of significant messages about the kind of place that com-
munity is or aspires to be.”70 
Truly good policing, then, is enjoyed by all people in common
whether or not they experience as individuals a positive outcome.
Generation of the individual good is “wholly, directly and recipro-
cally dependent upon its simultaneous generation for and enjoy-
ment by certain others.”71 I want to go further and say that my
argument implies not only a demand for policing that is assertedly
social, as Waldron suggests, but constitutive, too, in the way that
Ian Loader and Neil Walker additionally claim. It is not enough for
policing to simply solve collective action problems associated with
the project of crime reduction. Policing should also play a role in the
production of self-identity that helps to “construct and sustain
our ‘we-feeling’—our very felt sense of ‘common publicness.’”72
Legitimacy, then, can be a key driver of a healthy and properly
functioning democratic government.
69. Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the
Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 111-13 (2005).
70. Ian Loader, Policing, Recognition, and Belonging, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 202, 211 (2006) (citation omitted) (citing Neil Walker, Policing and the Supernatural, 12
POLICING & SOC’Y 307, 315 (2002)); see also Tracey L. Meares, The Progressive Past, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 209, 209-12 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
71. IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY 154 (2007) (citing JEREMY
WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 358-59 (1993)).
72.  Id. at 164.
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No doubt I make some uncomfortable by promoting the notion
that police should be involved in this work—especially those who
believe that having less police is always better. What we know,
however, is that police are involved in the business of constructing
community identity. The empirical distinctions we demonstrate
between lawfulness assessments of police conduct on the one hand
and fairness assessments on the other powerfully suggest that
people understand police treatment of citizens in the constitutive
manner that Loader and Walker describe. Moreover, we know that
there are potentially negative consequences of this kind of psycho-
logical processing. Too often, identifiable groups—typically minority
—receive the short end of the stick in this constitutive process. At
the very least, we should take what steps we can to address the
consequences of this reality on the ground and aspire to promote
the Good Cop.
